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EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
REAL PROPERTY AND THEIR RELATION TO
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND
PAUL McREYNOLDS JONES*

P

RIOR to the middle of the nineteenth century, a contract not to use land in a particular manner was
treated by a court of equity in the same way as were other
negative contracts. Where the violation of a contract
caused the plaintiff to be so injured in the enjoyment of
his land that damages at law did not furnish an adequate
remedy, equity would specifically enforce the contract
by granting an injunction against the promisor.' The
right thus to control the use of property in the hands of
the promisor can hardly be classified as other than a
property right. But since it was enforcible only against
the promisor, (unless there was a covenant running with
the land), it was a property right that could easily be destroyed by any alienation of the property, and therefore
was of comparatively small value.
Although the doctrines of equitable restrictions and
covenants running with the land serve kindred purposes,
the latter are subject to limitations unknown to equitable
easements, and the distinguishing characteristics are important to keep before us. The cornerstone case regarding
covenants which run with the land is Spencer's Case,2
decided in 1583. Spencer and his wife demised a house
and land to A for twenty-one years, A covenanting for
himself, his executors, administrators, and assigns to
build a brick wall upon part of the demised premises. A
assigned to B, and B conveyed to the defendant who
refused to build the wall. Spencer and his wife then
*Member of Illinois and Michigan Bars; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
I Promise not to ring a bell, Martin et al. v. Nutkin et al., 2 P. Wms. 266
(1724) ; promise not to break up mowing land, Lord Grey De Wilton v. Saxon,
6 Ves. Jr. 106 (1801).
2 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72.
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brought an action of covenant, upon which case the court
held:
When the covenant extends to a thing in esse, parcel of the
demise, the thing to be done by force of the covenant is quodammodo annexed and appurtenant to the thing demised, and shall
go with the land, and shall bind the assignee, although he be not
bound by express words: but when the covenant extends to a
thing not in being at the time of the demise made, it cannot be
appurtenant or annexed to the thing which hath no being: as if
the lessee covenanted to repair the houses demised to him during
the term, that is parcel of the contract, and extends to the support of the thing demised, and therefore is quodrmmodo appurtenant to houses, and shall bind the assignee although he be not
bound expressly by the covenant: but in the case at bar, the
covenant concerns a thing which was not in esse at the time of
the demise made, but to be newly built after, and therefore shall
bind the covenantor, his executors, or administrators, and not the
assignee, for the law will not annex the covenant to a thing which
hath no being.
The two conditions, then, which were essential in order
that a covenant might run with the land and be binding
upon subsequent holders were: first, privity of estate between the party seeking to enforce the covenant and the
party to be charged; and second, the requirement that
the thing to be done touch or concern the land in question,
or something upon the land and in esse at the time the
covenant is undertaken. The right of an owner to control the use of property after title had passed to others
was allowed to rest within these rather narrow limits for
over two hundred years.
In 1848, Lord Cottenham, following the lead of two
earlier and somewhat obscure cases,' rendered a decision
in Tulk v. Moxhay,4 which was to become one of the milestones of English equity, an authoritative recognition of
new rights and new obligations incidental to the owner3 Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sim. 196, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (1838); Schreiber v.
Creed, 10 Sim. 9, 59 Eng. Rep. 515 (1839). See footnote 7 for further reference to these cases.
42 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).

EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS ON REAL PROPERTY

ship of real property. In the year 1808 the plaintiff, being
then the owner in fee of the vacant piece of ground in
Leicester Square, as well as of several of the houses
forming the Square, sold the piece of ground by the description of "Leicester Square Garden or Pleasure
Ground, with the equestrian statue then standing in the
centre thereof, and the iron railing and stonework around
the same," to one Elms in fee.
In the deed of conveyance was contained a covenant by
Elms, for himself, his heirs and assigns, with the plaintiff,
his heirs, executors and administrators, that "Elms, his
heirs, and assigns, should, and would from time to time,
and at all times thereafter at his and their own cost and
charges, keep and maintain the said piece of ground and
Square Garden, and the iron railing around the same in
its then form, and in sufficient and proper repair as a
Square Garden and Pleasure Ground, in an open state,
uncovered with any buildings, in neat and ornamental
order; and that it should be lawful for the inhabitants of
Leicester Square,.. . on payment of a reasonable rent for
the same, to have keys at their own expense and the privilege of admission therewith at any time or times into the
said Square Garden.... "
The piece of land so conveyed passed by divers mesne
conveyances into the hands of the defendant, whose purchase deed contained no similar covenant with his
vendor; but he admitted that at the time he purchased he
had notice of the covenant in the deed of 1808. When the
defendant manifested an intention to alter the character of the Square Garden, and asserted a right, if he
saw fit, to build upon it, the plaintiff, who still remained
owner of several houses in the Square, filed this bill for
an injunction; and an injunction was granted by the
Master of the Rolls to restrain the defendant from converting or using the piece of ground and Square Garden,
and the iron railing around the same, to or for any other
purpose than as a Square Garden and Pleasure Ground
in open state and uncovered with buildings.
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It was contended for the defendant that the covenant
did not run with the land so as to be binding at law upon
a purchaser from the covenantor. Reliance was placed on
a statement by Lord Brougham in Keppell v. Bailey5 that
notice of such a covenant did not give a court of equity
jurisdiction to enforce it by injunction against such purchaser, since, as Lord Brougham said, "The knowledge
by an assignee of an estate, that his assignor had assumed to bind others than the law authorises him to affect
by his contract-had attempted to create a real burthen
upon property, which is inconsistent with the nature of
that property, and unknown to the principles of the law
-cannot bind such assignee by affecting his conscience." 6
But the defendant's contention was overruled by the
Lord Chancellor, who said:
That this court has jurisdiction to enforce a contract between
the owner of land and his neighbor purchasing a part of it, that

the latter shall either use or abstain from using the land purchased in a particular way, is what I never knew disputed. Here
there is no question about the contract; the owner of certain
houses in the square sells the land adjoining, with a covenant
from the purchaser not to use it for any other purpose than as
a Square Garden. And it is now contended, not that the vendee
could violate that contract, but that he might sell the piece of
land, and that the purchaser from him may violate it without
this court having any power to interfere. If that were so, it
would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it

without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless. It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run

with land, this court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not
whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party
shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with
the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of
which he purchased. Of course, the price would be affected by
the covenant, and nothing could be more inequitable than that
the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next
5 2 My. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1834).
6 Ibid., at p. 547, p. 1053.
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day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being
allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken.
That the question does not depend upon whether the
covenant
runs with the land is evident from this, that if there was a mere
agreement and no covenant, this court would enforce it against
a party purchasing with notice of it; for if an equity is attached
to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of
that equity can stand in a different situation from the party
from whom he purchased. There are not only cases before the
Vice-Chancellor of England 7 . . . in which he considered that
doctrine as not in dispute, but looking at the ground on which
Lord Eldon disposed of the case of The Duke of Bedford v. The
Trustees of the British Museum, s it is impossible to suppose that
he entertained any doubt of it....
With respect to the observations of Lord Brougham in Keppell
v. Bailey, he never could have meant to lay down that this court
would not enforce an equity attached to land by the owner, unless under such circumstances as would maintain an action at
law. If that be the result of his observations, I can only say that
I cannot coincide with it.
The fact of notice to the grantee which is of such obvious significance in the mind of the chancellor is not, however, of sole importance. The mere lack of actual or constructive notice will not relieve the successor in possession
from the obligation of the covenant. The subsequent
taker must be a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice, actual or constructive, if he would escape the obligation of his predecessor. The following cases illustrate
this.
In Mander v. Falcke,9 the servitude was enforced against
one in possession who was not a bona fide purchaser for
7 Here referring to Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sim. 196 (1838), and Schreiber
v. Creed, 10 Sim. 9 (1839). In the former case lots were sold under a restriction prohibiting the erection or operation of inns and taverns. The defendant
was a grantee with actual notice of the restriction, although the deed to him
was silent on that point. He was enjoined from violating the covenant of his
grantor.

82 My. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1822).
later herein.
9 [18911 2 Ch. 554.

This case will be treated
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value, irrespective of the question of notice. The defendants were father and son. The son was the lessee of the
premises in question, and the father was manager. The
plaintiffs were the assignees of the reversion. The lease
contained a covenant by the lessee not to do or cause or
permit to be done upon the premises anything which
might grow to the annoyance, damage, injury, prejudice,
or inconvenience of the premises, or of the adjoining
property. The evidence showed that the premises, which
were ostensibly used as an oyster bar and refreshment
rooms, were in fact operated as a disorderly house, to the
great annoyance of the neighborhood. In opposing an
injunction, counsel for the defendants contended that the
restriction as to use did not extend to the father, he having no notice of it, and having no interest, legal or equitable, in the property or the lease. The court granted the
injunction against both father and son on the ground
that the father's interest as an occupier managing the
business, with nothing more, was sufficient to bind him to
the covenant; the father, by leave of the son, was in possession of the premises, and not being a purchaser for
value, was bound by the same restrictive covenants as
the son.
In re Nisbet and Potts' Contract ° was a case involving
the obligation of an adverse possessor to observe rights
vested under restrictive covenants. Here the suit arises
upon a refusal of the vendee to accept a deed because of
alleged defects in the title. The vendor bought a squatter's interest in free-hold land, the adverse possession having continued for longer than the statutory period. After
entering into the contract and before conveyance of title,
the vendee discovered, independently of the vendor, that
the property had been subject to building restrictions
prior to the squatter's possession. He then refused to go
through with the deal, because of the uncertainty as to
extinguishment of those restrictions by reason of the
adverse possession. It was contended by counsel for the
vendor that the squatter never was an assignee, that he
10 [1906] 1 Ch. 386.
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never was a purchaser, and that therefore he did not
come under the condition that a purchaser with notice of
a restrictive covenant is bound by it; but that the squatter is a person who takes by a title given to him by law,
and which, it was contended, is paramount to and overrides any such obligations as would otherwise have attached to the land; in other words, that the squatter, coming in by operation of law and not by conveyance, takes
independently and free from all such collateral obligations. The court, however, held for the vendee, and denied specific performance, holding that the Statute of
Limitations bars only the rights of those whose rights
have been infringed. Quoting from the opinion of Master
of the Rolls Collins:
Now, the Statute of Limitations ...

does not purport to annul

by lapse of time any rights other than those which persons might
have, and ought to have, exercised during the period limited....
In fact, unless and until the right of the covenantee has been in
some way infringed, so that it becomes necessary for him to
enforce that right, there is no reason ... why his right should in

any way be affected. The person who stands simply with the
benefit of a negative easement is certainly not put upon the
assertion of his right unless and until that right has been interfered with in some way; and it is a matter of absolute indifference to him what person is the owner of the land over which
that right exists until that land is used in some manner incompatible with the assertion of that right on the part of the person
entitled to it.
Two other early English cases of primary importance
in the development of the principles of equitable restrictions are The Duke of Bedford v. The Trustees of the
British Museum" and London & Southwestern Railway
Co. v. Gomm. 12 These cases will be discussed later, the
former in connection with loss of benefits under restrictive covenants due to change in character of the community, and the latter with respect to the enforcibility of
affirmative covenants.
112 My. & K. 552 (1822).
1220 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
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One of the oldest American cases in line with Tulk v.
Moxhay was Whitney v. Union Railway Company13 which
came before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in 1860. The owner of a tract of land laid it out in lots
for dwelling houses and conveyed one lot with the restriction that if the grantee, his heirs or assigns, should use
or follow, or suffer any person to use or follow, upon any
part thereof, the business of a taverner, or any mechanical or manufacturing, or any nauseous or offensive business whatever, then the grantors, or any person or persons at any time thereafter, who at the time might be a
proprietor of any lot of land ... within the same tract,
should have the right, after sixty days' notice, to enter
upon the premises, and forcibly to remove therefrom
any buildings erected or used contrary to the above restrictions, and to abate all nuisances. The court held these
restrictions enforcible in equity, at the suit of the original
grantor against an assignee of the grantee, such assignee
having notice of the restriction when he purchased.
The Supreme Court of Illinois first recognized the prin14
ciple of Tulk v. Moxhay in the case of Frye v. Partridge
decided in 1876. Lewis and another were the owners of
land lying on both sides of the Illinois river, across which
they were operating a ferry. These owners conveyed
away part of the land on one side of the river, but, for
the purpose of protecting the ferry from close competition, provided in the deed that "Coleman J. Gibson, of
the second part, and his heirs and assigns, are not to esIablish or authorize the establishment of a common ferryboat landing on such land, to ply between there and the
opposite shore, without having permission from the said
Lewis, of the first part, or his heirs or assigns." The suit
arose upon the assertion of right, on the part of a grantee
of Gibson, to establish a ferry-boat landing on the land so
conveyed. The court enjoined the intended acts, saying
that such provision is obligatory on the assignee of such
grantee, and that a court of equity would, at the suit of
'3 11 Gray (Mass.)

1482 IIl. 267.

359, 71 Am. Dec. 715 (1860).
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a devisee of the original owner, enjoin the establishment
of a ferry landing on such land.
When a vendee purchases with full notice of a valid agreement
between his vendor and the original owner, concerning the manner in which the property is to be occupied, it is but a reasonable
and equitable requirement to hold him bound to abide by the
contract under which the land was conveyed.
The right of a covenantee to enforce the agreement, in
addition to being a property right, is also of a personal
nature. The grantee of the benefited, or dominant, land
succeeds to the property right, but the transfer does not
extinguish the personal interest of the original party to
the covenant. In Van Sant v. Rose, 1 the violation of a
building restriction, by an assignee, was enjoined at the
suit of an original party to the restrictive covenant. This
party had, prior to the commencement of the suit, sold
and conveyed all his holdings that could be affected by a
breach of the covenant. 16
At this point it may be noted that while privity of
estate is a sine qua non of covenants which run with the
15260 Ill. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913).
16 This decision was severely criticised by George L. Clark in his article,
"Equitable Servitudes," 16 Mich. L. Rev. 90. The writer there argued that
relief should have been denied because the complainant no longer had property
which would in any way be damaged or affected by a breach of the covenant.
He says of the case (p. 97): "If this reasoning were followed to its logical
conclusion the plaintiffs would have been able to enforce a restriction even
tho[ugh] they had never owned any land in the vicinity except that which
they sold to the defendant, Frank Rose, indeed, even if the plaintiffs had
never owned any land whatever but had bargained with the defendant in
some other way for the restriction. Whether the equity courts will take these
last two steps and recognize to the full the doctrine of equitable servitudes in
gross remains to be seen. The decision in Van Sant v. Rose is a striking
example of the tendency of equity in the United States to become mechanical."
This criticism is unsupported in the law, and is based upon the erroneous
assumption that a showing of damage, actual br threatened, is essential to
the granting of an injunction to restrain the breach of a negative covenant.
The authorities are all the other way: "The amount of damages, and even
the fact that the plaintiff has sustained any pecuniary damages, are wholly
immaterial." Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, (3d ed.) sec. 1341. And to the
same effect: Bispham, Equity, (10th ed., 1922) sec. 461: Kerr on Injunctions,
(4th ed.) p. 370; Doherty v. Allman, 3 App. Cas. 709 (1878) ; Leech v. Schweder, L. R. 9 Ch. App. Cas. 463, 468 (1874) and authorities there cited. In the
Van Sant case the simple fact that the complainant was the covenantee was
sufficient to enable him to maintain his suit in equity to restrain a violation
of the covenant. He sought to enforce only a pure contractual right, independently of any property interest whatever.
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land, it is quite unnecessary to the validity of equitable
easements and restrictions. These servitudes, cognizable
in equity alone, are binding not only between parties in
the same chain of title but may even be enforced between
two remote grantees of the covenantor, claiming under
him by way of independent chains of title. Parker et al.
v. Nightingale et al.17 was such a case. There, the owners
of a tract of land divided it into lots and orally agreed
among themselves that the same should not be used for
other than dwelling houses. This condition was incorporated in the deeds by which the lots were subsequently
conveyed. In a suit by one grantee against another who
claimed through a different chain of title, but whose
property was subject to the same restriction, the defendant was enjoined from converting a dwelling into a restaurant. The court held the defendant bound by the covenant with notice of which he bought, citing Tulk v. Moxhay and Whitney v. Union Railway Company, supra.
An early New Jersey case embodying this development
of the doctrine was Winfield v. Henning.18 The complainant owned adjacent lots and both he and the defendant
took title by mesne conveyances from one Keeney. Keeney
had acquired the property by a conveyance providing for
a ten foot building line. The deeds to the complainant
and defendant did not refer to the restriction, but their
knowledge of it was not disputed. In granting the injunction restraining the defendant from encroaching upon the
ten foot strip, the court took the view that, since both lots
were subject to the same easement in favor of the land
of the original covenantee and both parties would be
liable upon the covenant of their grantor if an action
were brought against them by the covenantee, each of
these two remote grantees was justly and equitably entitled to the advantage which the observance of the covenant by his neighbor may be to him.
Another phase of the reciprocal character of the right
to enforce equitable easements is aptly described by the
17 88 Mass. 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632 (1863).
18 21 N. J. Eq. 188 (1870).
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Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Sanborn et al.
v. McLean et al." The court said, in part:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained,
the servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint,
the owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to
the owner of the lot sold. For want of a better descriptive term
this is styled a reciprocal, negative easement. . . . It is not
personal to owners, but operative upon use of the land by
any owner having actual or constructive notice thereof ...
Such a scheme of restriction must start with a common owner;
it cannot arise and fasten upon one lot by reason of other lot
owners conforming to a general plan.
The courts in many other jurisdictions, notably Massachusetts and New Jersey, have taken similar positions.2"
These reciprocal burdens and benefits attach to the
land, and are enforcible in favor of and against individuals by virtue of their ownership of that land. If it is
clear, then, that the benefit of an equitable easement is a
property right, these questions may logically arise: Is it
property within the meaning of the constitutional provisions, state and Federal, which prohibit the taking of
private property for a public use without just compensation? May a public or quasi-public corporation having
the power of eminent domain acquire the fee in property
burdened with equitable restrictions, and thereafter violate those restrictions with impunity? Or must compensation be paid to the owner of the dominant tenement as
well as to the owner of the fee? Answers of the authorities differ.
In Flynn v. New York, Westchester and Boston Railway Company et al.,2 the defendant was the owner of
thirty-eight lots, and the plaintiff owned two lots nearby,
19 233 Mich. 227, 206 N. W. 496 (1925).
20 Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N. W. 701 (1907) ; Badger v. Board.
man, 82 Mass. 559 (1860) ; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381 (1872); Haines v.
Einwachter, 55 A. 38 (N. J. 1903); Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464,
133 N. W. 317, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890 (1911); Hemsley v. Marlborough
Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 A. 14 (1901).
21218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916).
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all situated in the same subdivision and subject to certain
building restrictions. The defendant constructed railroad tracks over its property and began the operation of
trains, which acts were alleged to be in violation of the
restrictions to which the property was subject. The Supreme Court of New York held the benefits of the restrictive building covenants to be property rights of the
plaintiff, which could not be taken for a public use without just compensation, and affirmed the lower court's
order requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
$3370. An owner of property situated in Stamford, Connecticut was held entitled to compensation on account of
the erection of a public school building in violation of certain building restrictions affecting both his own land and
that used for the school.22 The case of Riverbank Improvement Company v. Chadwick,23 while. not on all fours with
the two previous cases, indicates that a similar result
would be reached in Massachusetts.
Ohio, on the other hand, is committed to the opposite
view. In the only two cases in that state which the writer
was able to discover, the Supreme Court denied the claims
of property owners to compensation for similar injury.24
A railroad and a street railway company were the respective defendants. The court held the restrictions invalid as to a public agency, and for authority drew upon
a case decided in the Federal circuit court involving con25
demnation of land by the United States government. It
Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 107 Conn. 596, 143 A. 245 (1928).
23228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917).
24 Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505
(1915); Ward et al. v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 463, 112 N. E. 507
(1915).
25 United States v. Certain Lands, 112 F. 622 (1899). This proceeding was
for the acquisition, by the Government, of shore line property near Jamestown, Rhode Island, for the construction of coast defense fortifications. Part of
the court's opinion is quoted: "As each owner of land holds his property
subject to the devesting of his title through the action of the state or of the
United States, based on public necessity, can he by any means, directly or
indirectly, impose upon the state or the United States the burden of compensating him for damage resulting from that public use which does not
directly invade his land? . . .Can it be possible that these owners, by mutual
agreements or covenants that they or their successors in title will not do
things which may be necessary for national defense, and by agreeing that
22
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was there held that damages suffered by reason of nonobservance by the government of prior restrictive covenants were not compensable under the eminent domain
provision of the Constitution. After quoting at length
from that case the Ohio court said, "What was said by
the court in that case in reference to the state and government applies with equal force to a railroad corporation
or any agency of the state which is vested with the right
of eminent domain." Accepting the reasoning of the Federal court in the case cited, there would seem to be little
question as to the right of the United States or a state
to acquire title free and clear of equitable restrictions.
But as to quasi-public corporations for profit, such as
railroads and the utilities, it is submitted that the question may still be considered an open one. The weight of
authority, it would seem, favors compensation.
The extent and scope that equitable easements are recognized varies in the several states. In Bryan v. Grosse
et al.,26 an agreement was entered into between adjoining owners relative to building restrictions. It was stipulated that the agreement should run with the land. In a
suit against a remote grantee who sought to avoid the
obligation of the agreement, the court held the restricthese things are noxious and offensive to them, compel the United States to pay
them for the right to do, upon the lands taken, what is necessary for the
protection of the nation?
"If such a right can exist against the state or nation, and can be considered
property, then only a mere device of conveyancing is necessary to defeat
entirely the rule that depreciation of property incidental to a public use does
not constitute a 'taking'; for private deeds may then provide in express terms
against such uses as may be necessary in case the government exercises the
right of eminent domain. If these private covenants are, as against the government and state, to be recognized as property, then the government, by taking
such uses, takes private property, and must make compensation. . . . While
the owners may so contract as to control private business, and thereby increase
the values of their estates, they are not entitled so to contract as to control
the action of the government, or to increase the values of their lands by any
expectation or belief that the government will not carry on public works in
their vicinity, or that in case it does it will compensate them for the loss due
to the defeat of their expectation that it would not. . . . Each landowner holds
his estate subject to the public necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain for public purposes. He cannot evade this by any agreement
with his neighbor, nor can his neighbor acquire a right from a private individual which imposes a new burden upon the public in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain."
26 155 Cal. 132, 99 P. 499 (1909).
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tion valid and binding in equity, declaring that the stipulation that the agreement should run with the land was
immaterial since the present defendant had notice of the
agreement when he purchased. And to the same effect is
the often-cited2 7New York case, Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch.
While in general it may be said that equitable easements cannot arise except by written agreement, one important exception is to be noted. That is the case where
lots are sold with reference to a map or plat showing the
grantor's intention as to what shall be the character28 of
the other property so platted. In Stevenson v. Lewis it
was held:
When an owner of land makes a plat thereof, showing lots,
streets and public grounds, and sells the lots with reference
to the plat, the purchasers of the lots acquire, as appurtenant
thereto, every easement, privilege and advantage which the plat
represents as belonging to them. . . The sale and conveyance
of lots according to the plat imply a covenant that the streets
and other public places indicated on the plat shall be forever
open to the use of the public, free from all claim or interference of the proprietor inconsistent with such use.
The court's opinion is silent as to whether there must
be actual reference to the plat in the deed. The much
earlier case of Zearing v. Raber 29 was similar, but the
court's decision was based partly on the fact that the
deed contained an express reference to the plat, although
the latter had not been acknowledged or recorded.3 0 In
Tallmadge v. The East River Bank31 it was held that
where there was an oral agreement as to a building line,
a reference to a plat showing the same, and a uniform
observance of such building line by existing structures,
remote grantees with notice of the oral agreement were
bound. In a later case3 2 in the same state, a mere oral
2770 N. Y. 440 (1877).
28244
2974

Ill. 147, 91 N. E. 56 (1910).
I1. 409 (1874).

80 See Marsh et al. v. Village of Fairbury, 163 Ill. 401, 45 N. E. 236 (1896);
Village of Benld v. Dorsey, 311 Ill. 192, 142 N. E. 563 (1924).
3126 N. Y. 105 (1862).
32 Hayward Homestead Tract Ass'n v. Miller, 26 N. Y. S. 1091 (1893).
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agreement, without reference to any map or plat, was
held binding upon remote grantees with notice, and the
Tallmadge case was cited for authority. The decision
there, of course, does not support such a position, and it
is submitted that the court went too far in holding a
mere oral agreement, with nothing more, enforcible
against remote grantees, even though they had notice
that some sort of agreement had been entered into by
their predecessors. Restrictions on the use of real property are not favored in the law, and doubts are usually
resolved against them."8
Among the classes of cases in which the courts have
refused to enforce restrictive agreements, the first to be
discussed is that group in which there has been an attempt to restrain trade or commerce. In Hodge v. Sloan84
the complainant, owner of about forty acres of land, was
in the sand business. He sold a parcel containing about
one-half acre, and the grantee covenanted not to: dig or
sell sand. Subsequent grantees or assignees were not
mentioned in the deed. The grantee conveyed to his son,
no reference being made to the prior covenant. The son
had actual knowledge, however, of the restriction. The
court, after deciding that the restriction was not such
restraint of trade as to be illegal, held that the son, as a
grantee with notice of the covenant, was bound.
Brewer v. Marshall and Cheeseman35 is one of the outstanding cases with respect to the invalidity of covenants
in general restraint of trade. In that case, the complainant and the defendant owned adjacent parcels of land,
the former approximately twenty-eight acres, the latter
a larger tract. Both derived title by mesne conveyances
from one George Cheeseman. The latter's conveyance
to the grantor of the complainant contained this cove83 In Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556 (1893), lots numbered
1 to 12 were sold "for single dwellings" on each lot of 50 feet. The restriction
was liberally construed, and a four story apartment building erected on lots
1 and 2, with a partition on the lot line was held to comply with the attempted
restriction.
84 107 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335 (1887).
35 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679 (1868).
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nant: "Also the said George Cheeseman, his heirs or
assigns, are not to sell any marl, by the rood or quantity,
from off his premises adjoining the above property." The
tract so burdened came into the hands of the defendant
who, notwithstanding the terms of the covenant, claims
and exercises an alleged right to sell marl therefrom. The
court held that, although the defendant was chargeable
with notice of the prior covenant because it appeared in
his chain of title, the burden would not be enforced. The
covenant is one in unreasonable restraint of trade, and
therefore is illegal and void. In the words of the opinion,
"It prohibits the sale of it [marl] at any time, in any
market, either by the owner of the land or by his assigns. ... The restraint it imposes is general, both as to
time, place, and persons." In commenting upon the doctrine of equitable restrictions, and cautioning against its
extension, the court laments the state of affairs where
the owner of land may impress upon it any of his notions, and
equity will see that the land shall retain such impress in the
hands of every subsequent holder. . . . Thus incidents can be
annexed to land, as multiform and as innumerable as human
caprice .... These are the evils which I think will unavoidably
result from adopting any principle which will sustain the bill
in this case ....
In my judgment, the decisions in this branch
should be followed, but not transcended. If this, then, were the
only objection to the case of the complainant, I should be opposed
to granting him the relief for which he asks.
In addition to covenants in general restraint of trade,
courts of equity may also refuse specific performance or
injunctive relief where there has been such a change in
circumstances since the date of the covenant as could not
possibly have been in the contemplation of the parties.
For example, by reason of irregular observance of a
building line, all of the benefits expected from the original
plan may have been lost. The court may then refuse to
recognize that the restrictions still exist. In Curtis v.
Rubin;6 it was shown that a fifteen foot building line was
36244 Il1. 88, 91 N. E. 84 (1910).
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ignored by all builders on one side of a particular block
in the city of Chicago. The encroachments varied from
three to four feet. A corner store was begun, which when
completed would extend about eight feet beyond the line.
An injunction against the builder was sought, but was
denied on the grounds, first, that the plan as originally
adopted had obviously been abandoned by tacit, common
consent, and second, that the complainants themselves
were guilty of violating the very restriction they now
sought to enforce. This decision was7 cited with approval
and followed in Kneip v. SchroederY
A case somewhat similar is Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg.38
The appellant had begun an apartment building which
would extend twenty-six feet over a building line. It was
shown that a number of other lots so restricted were improved with buildings which extended fifteen to eighteen
feet beyond the line. The lower court held that the appellant was limited to an encroachment of eighteen and
nine-tenths feet, which was the largest existing at the
time of the suit. But the Supreme Court, because of the
previous, apparent disposition to ignore the line, and in
view of the encroachments then existing, allowed the appellant to disregard the restriction entirely. In so deciding, the court said:
We do not mean to say that an easement abandoned in part will
be held as abandoned altogether, for where it is abandoned pro
tanto only, and a material and beneficial part remains, it will be
protected. But while such restrictions are sometimes treated as
easements, it is apparent that the value of a restriction of this

character depends very largely on the uniformity of its observance in the improvement of property affected by it. In the case
at bar it cannot be said there has been any uniform observance
of the restriction in the vicinity of the property in question ...
and we are of the opinion that the value of the easement-treating it as such-for all practical purposes has been destroyed.
Thus, unchallenged violations of a restrictive covenant
may be grounds for refusing equitable relief.
37255 Ill. 621, 98 N. E. 998 (1912).

38 186 I1. 344, 57 N. E. 105 (1900).
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There is a closely related class of cases where the exercise of the chancellor's authority is also entirely discretionary. Where there has been such a change in the
character of the neighborhood or surroundings as to defeat the objects and purposes of the parties to the covenant, and to render it inequitable to deprive a grantee,
or his successor in title, of the privilege of conforming
his property to that changed character, injunctive relief
may be denied. This principle was announced twenty-six
years before Tulk v. Moxhay in the case of The Duke of
Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum."9 A century
and a half before this suit two families of wealth and
nobility, owning adjoining tracts, by mutual covenants
restricted their lands, respectively, to a mansion and the
usual gardens. The covenants were adhered to through
many years and many transfers of title. However, in the
course of time, one mansion was torn down, a street was
extended across the property, and the character of the
nearby real estate became greatly altered. In this suit,
the Duke sought to prevent a proposed addition to the
museum on a portion of the restricted property. The
court denied his petition, and held that the equitable right
which once existed had been lost by the permissive change
in the use of the property years before.
Page v. Murray" is a domestic example of how a
change in neighborhood characteristics may affect the
enforcibility of building restrictions. On May 10, 1873,
the complainant, Henry Page, entered into an agreement
with Marshall Ward and Peter Gerbert whereby the
former granted a right of way for a road across certain
of his lands, to reach lands of Ward and Gerbert. In consideration of the grant, the latter agreed not to use or
permit the use of their property in enumerated businesses, all of a nuisance character. They also covenanted
that for the following twenty years no building, except
necessary outbuildings, should be erected costing less
than $3000. In 1890 the defendant, who had acquired title
392 My. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1822).
4046 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 A. 11 (1890).
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through mesne conveyances, began the erection of a house
which was designed to cost about $2000. This suit was
brought to enjoin construction. It appeared from the
evidence that the years between 1873 and 1890 had witnessed a considerable development of the lands surrounding the tract affected by the agreement, and that some
twenty-five or thirty houses had been built just outside
the said tract, their costs ranging from $700 to $2500.
One, larger than the others, had cost about $8000. The
only building on the restricted area, other than that of
the present defendant, was a $2000 greenhouse with a
residence adjoining. In denying the petition for an injunction, the court said:
The evident purpose of the covenant was to protect the locality
to which it applied from businesses that were likely to create a
nuisance and buildings of the cheapest grade, and thereby bring
to it a better class of buildings, and insure its occupation by
quiet, orderly, and well-to-do people. With this intention, the
covenant arbitrarily names a price that all buildings to be
erected must cost . .. but now, after seventeen years have expired, and no buildings of the value contemplated have been
built on the land affected by the agreement, while upon adjacent
land cheaper buildings have multiplied, it appears to be too late
for the covenant to secure the desired end.
In Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher4' the
changed character of the locality was deemed a sufficient
reason for relieving an owner from the obligation of a
covenant restricting certain property to residential use.
In a case where specific performance or a writ of injunction is denied, the court may leave the party to his
remedy at law, or in its discretion may retain jurisdic42
tion of the cause for the purpose of assessing damages.
4
In Amerman v. Deane" complainant and defendant took
title from a common source and both parties were sub4187 N. Y. 311 (1882).
42 And, according to a rather anomalous Massachusetts case, Jackson v.
Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496 (1892), this is so whether or not a remedy at law
existed.
48132 N. Y. 355, 30 N. E. 741, 28 Am. St. Rep. 584 (1892).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

ject to a covenant prohibiting the erection of a tenement
house. In this action by the owner of a private residence
to restrain the violation of this covenant, it was proved
that, with few exceptions, the entire surrounding neighborhood had been built up with flats and tenement houses,
that the tenement which the defendant had begun was a
large one, and that he had already spent a considerable
sum thereon. The court refused a permanent injunction,
but fixed the damages as the difference in value of complainant's premises with and without defendant's tenement, and awarded an injunction restraining the defendant from renting the building to any tenant until such
damages and costs were paid.
Thus far the discussion has been confined to negative
covenants. It is proposed to turn now to covenants of an
affirmative character, requiring in all cases positive acts,
which courts of equity are asked to enforce by way of
specific performance. This doctrine, while recognized
as within the jurisdiction of equity, has its practical limitations in the reluctance of the courts to decree an act
or series of acts which may be difficult of supervision.
Equity will rarely decree specific performance of affirmative contracts calling for the exercise of skill, discretion,
or good faith on the part of the defendant.
The early cases disclose a marked disinclination of the
chancellors even to issue an order or decree in affirmative,
directory, or mandatory terms. The manner of obtaining
affirmative acts by a negative decree, so characteristic of
the English courts, is well illustrated in Lane v. Newdigate,44 where a covenant to repair and maintain locks and
stopgates in a canal was enforced. The plaintiff was the
assignee of a lease, and the defendant was the lessor.
The latter was currently failing to maintain a certain
water level in a canal, thereby violating a covenant with
the plaintiff's assignor. Lord Chancellor Eldon, on the
44 10 Ves. Jr. 192, 32 Eng. Rep. 818 (1804). Note: The reference to this
case is for the sole purpose of showing the attitude of extreme reluctance assumed by the chancellors of a century ago in matters of covenants requiring
affirmative action. The case is one of a covenant running with the land, and is
not to be considered a forerunner of Tulk v. Moxhay.

EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS ON REAL PROPERTY

trial, expressed a difficulty whether it was according to
the practice of the court to order repairs to be done. He
said, further:
So, as to restoring the Stop-gate, the same difficulty occurs. The
question is, whether the Court can specifically order that to be
restored. I think I can direct it in terms, that will have that
effect. The Injunction, I shall order, will create the necessity
of restoring the Stop-gate; and attention will be had to the manner in which he [the defendant] is to use these locks; and he
will find it difficult, I apprehend, to avoid completely repairing
these works.
The report continues with the order subsequently pronounced:
that the Defendant, his agents, &c., be restrained until farther
Order, from farther impeding, obstructing, or hindering, the
Plaintiff from navigating the canal . . . contrary to the cove-

nant, by continuing to keep the said canals, or the banks, gates,
locks,... out of good repair, order or condition; .

.

. or by con-

tinuing the removal of the Stop-gate, mentioned in the pleadings
in the action, brought by the Plaintiff, to have been erected; and
by means of which the water could and would have been kept
and retained....
As late as 1877 the same shyness may be noticed in
Luker v. Dennis,45 where there was a covenant to buy beer
of the covenantee for use in a public house, and a subsequent purchaser of the house with notice of the covenant was enjoined from buying beer of anyone else. This,
it will be recognized, is but a restatement of the principles of the well known cases of Lumley v. Wagner46 and
Lumley v. Gye.47
The decision in Cooke v. Chilcott4s registers the greatest extent to which the English courts have gone in granting enforcement of affirmative, equitable covenants. In
that case, an agreement to supply adjoining land with
457 Ch. D. 227 (1877).
46 5 DeG. & Sm. 485, 64 Eng. Rep. 1.209 (1852).
472 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
& B1. 114, 118 Eng. Rep. 1083 (1854).
483 Ch. D. 694 (1876).
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water was enforced, although it necessitated laying pipes
and erecting machinery. The later English decisions have
enforced only negative covenants." The reversal of the
trend in England was so complete that only six years
after Cooke v. Chilcott the court denied specific performance of a covenant to reconvey land, on the ground that
it required an affirmative act. In London and Southwestern Railway Company v. Gomm," the railway company
had sold land then believed to be superfluous, but took
a covenant purporting to bind the purchaser, his heirs,
assigns, etc., that the land would. be reconveyed upon payment of a specified sum. The railway company was denied any right to recover the land from a grantee of the
covenantee on the ground above stated.
'The tendency of the courts of the empire to enforce
only negative, or restrictive, covenants has not been followed generally in this country. As to matters of performance, the courts here have observed the same rules
and limitations in enforcing equitable easements and
servitudes that would govern the enforcement of covenants running with the land. Prominent among cases in
the United States where performance of an affirmative
covenant was ordered is Whittenton Manufacturing Company v. Staples." The owner of a dam and reservoir contracted with five proprietors upstream whereby each of
the latter assumed one-fifth the liability for overflow damages to any and all strangers, in return for certain rights
in the reservoir. The instant suit was brought by an
assignee of the original owner of the reservoir against
a remote grantee of one of the five covenantors, to recover one-fifth of certain overflow damages resulting to
a third party. Relief was decreed as prayed.
In Lydick v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company52 an agreement was made by the railroad company
to maintain a switch track for the use of a flour mill, its
49 Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (1885) ; Haywood v.
Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society, 8 Q. B. D. 403 (1881).
5020 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
51 164 Mass. 319, 41 N. E. 441 (1895).
52 17 W. Va. 427 (1880).
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then owners and all subsequent owners. A remote grantee
of the mill property, who took with notice of this covenant, was permitted to enforce it against the railroad
company. Many similar cases are to be found in other
jurisdictions."3
It is suggested, in conclusion, that the scope and usefulness of equitable easements and covenants at the present day is such as to give their practical value a rank of
unquestioned superiority over their ancestors-covenants
which run with the land. With our system of registration
of land titles, the required notice to subsequent owners
is implied by law the moment the document embodying
the covenant is recorded. And as to the advantage of
avoiding the necessity of privity of estate between parties, comment is hardly necessary.
The history of the development of the law relating to
restrictive covenants and agreements since Tulk v. Moxhay in 1848 is typical of the way in which doctrines developed by courts of equity continue to be a vital force in
our law, by which it retains its flexibility and adaptibility
to new and changing conditions. It shows how these doctrines have moulded and shaped the more rigid and unyielding rules of law so as to make effective the intentions of contracting parties, and conform those rules to
new standards of living and to the economic needs of
the community.
53 Covenant to build a railroad station, Georgia Southern Railroad v. Reeves,
64 Ga. 492 (1880); to repair and maintain a dam, Maxon v. Lane, 102 Ind.
364, 1 N. E. 796 (1885); to assume and pay a mortgage, Bowen v. Beck,
94 N. Y. 86 (1883) ; to maintain a partition fence, Kellogg v. Robinson, 6
Vt. 276 (1834); to contribute to a party wall, Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind.
166, 26 N. E. 198 (1885): to build and forever maintain a fence, Burbank v.
Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475 (1869). In each of these cases the affirmative acts
required by the covenants were decreed to be specifically performed.

